Modeling the impact of an energy price shock on interregional income transfer by Clarence W. Nelson
Federal Reserve Bank 
of Minneapolis 
Summer 1988 
Modeling the Impact 
of an Energy Price Shock 
on Interregional 
Income Transfer (p. 2) 
Clarence W. Nelson 
The Relationship Between 
Money and Prices: 
Some Historical Evidence 
Reconsidered (p.18) 
Bruce D. Smith Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis 
Quarterly Review 
Vol. 12, NO. 3 ISSN 0271-5287 
This publication primarily presents economic research aimed at improving 
policymaking by the Federal Reserve System and other governmental 
authorities. 
Produced in the Research Department. Edited by Preston J. Miller, Kathleen 
S. Rolfe, and Inga Velde. Graphic design and typesetting by Barbara Birr, 
Public Affairs Department. 
Address questions to the Research Department, Federal Reserve Bank, 
Minneapolis, Minnesota 55480 (telephone 612-340-2341). 
Articles may be reprinted if the source is credited and the Research 
Department is provided with copies of reprints. 
The views expressed herein are those of the authors and not 
necessarily those of the Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis or 
the Federal Reserve System. Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis 
Quarterly Review Summer 1988 
Modeling the Impact of an Energy Price Shock 
on Interregional Income Transfer 
Clarence W. Nelson 
Vice President and Economic Adviser 
Research Department 
Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis 
In 1979-80 the Organization of Petroleum Exporting 
Countries (OPEC) doubled the world price of crude 
oil—the second upward oil price shock in a decade— 
and domestic producers of crude energy soon followed 
suit. Despite efforts to conserve energy, U.S. consumers' 
total energy spending increased as a result of the shock. 
Because certain parts of the United States have abun-
dant energy resources while most other parts have little, 
consumers in energy-poor states felt that their energy-
rich compatriots were reaping windfall gains—and 
largely at their expense. 
Public representatives of the energy-importing states 
(those states consuming more energy than they pro-
duce) reinforced this perception.
1 In some discussions, 
analysts cited the energy-importing states' increase in 
energy spending as a measure of income siphoned away 
to crude energy producers—some to OPEC and much 
to the energy-exporting states.
2 
That measure of income drainage was sizable. For 
example, data on U.S. energy consumption and produc-
tion in 1976 show that the energy-importing states (39 
in all) bought about 7 billion barrel-equivalents of 
crude energy from other domestic suppliers or OPEC.
3 
The 1979-80 price increase of roughly $8 per barrel-
equivalent of energy would therefore have increased 
their spending on "imported" energy by $56 billion. 
Even if energy consumers responded to the price hike 
by reducing their demand by, say, 20 percent, the 
increase in their energy spending would still have been 
an impressive $45 billion. 
That sizable measure of income transfer from 
energy-importing states to crude energy producers is 
incomplete, however, because it does not account for a 
number of factors in the U.S. economy that redistribute 
windfall income gains (or losses) across sectors and 
regions.
4 These factors include 
• The federal tax system. Uncle Sam, through corporate 
and personal income taxes, takes a cut of windfall 
gains and then redistributes the revenue more evenly 
across the population. 
• Cross-regional ownership of stocks. A Minnesotan 
holding Exxon stock receives higher dividends as the 
company prospers. 
• Cross-regional ownership of mineral rights. A New 
Yorker who owns mineral rights to oil from a 
Louisiana well receives higher royalty payments. 
• Interregional trade. Households in Texas have more 
1 In the popular press, accounts of debates over energy-related issues such 
as price decontrol and state severance taxes even alluded to the Civil War. See, 
for example, Wars between the states, 1981, p. 19, and Now energy is what 
counts in the war between the states, 1981, p. 166. 
2See, for example, references to income transfer in Chase Econometrics 
1978, p. C-6, and MDEPD 1982, p. 4. 
3The 1976 U.S. energy consumption and production figures are based on 
data reported in Chase Econometrics 1978, Table 5, p. B-l 1. 
4These redistributive factors were recognized earlier by Nelson (1981) and 
Pfister (1982), for example, as having a bearing on interstate income transfer 
resulting from an upward energy price shock. 
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disposable income to spend on cars produced in 
Michigan, thereby boosting Michigan household 
income a bit. 
To measure the impact of an energy price shock on the 
interregional transfer of income, these factors have to 
be considered. That is what this paper attempts to do, 
using the 1979-80 energy price shock as a case study. 
To begin, the paper provides a preliminary estimate 
of how much redistributive factors initially 
reduced income transferred from energy-importing to 
energy-exporting regions of the domestic economy as 
a result of the 1979-80 shock. This exercise introduces 
some key concepts used in the analysis and gives a 
sense of the magnitudes involved. The preliminary 
estimate, however, does not indicate how individual 
sectors of the economy would respond to the price 
shock, nor does it account for the economy's response 
over a longer stretch of time. 
To address these additional issues, a formal, multi-
sector model of the U.S. economy is presented. The 
model is set up to represent the relationships of product 
and payment flows among economic sectors in 1978, 
just before the shock. These relationships are then 
adjusted to reflect how the economy would be likely to 
respond to the 1979-80 shock over a couple years. A 
comparison of the model's pre- and postshock results 
shows that although the amount of income transferred 
from energy-importing to energy-exporting regions 
was significant, the redistributive factors did lessen the 
amount substantially. Moreover, the model's measure 
of income transfer is substantially lower than the 
increase in the energy-importing states' energy bill—an 
income loss measure often cited around the time of the 
shock. 
A Preliminary Estimate of Income Transfer 
This section presents a preliminary estimate of the 
amount by which the redistributive factors could lessen 
income transferred from energy-importing states to 
energy-exporting ones as a result of the 1979-80 
shock. This exercise gives a sense of how these factors 
work to redistribute income, introduces the measure of 
income transfer used here, and provides a rough idea of 
the magnitudes involved. 
Some Assumptions 
To perform this exercise, some assumptions are needed 
to characterize the U.S. economy in 1978, just before 
the shock. I assume that the economy consists of two 
domestic regions, one with abundant crude energy 
supplies and the other with no crude energy resources at 
all. For convenience, I refer to the former as energy-rich 
and the latter as energy-poor. The two regions are an 
abstraction based on observations of the U.S. regional 
situation in 1978. Of the two, the energy-poor region is 
the larger, making up roughly five-sixths of the total 
U.S. population at the time. 
Data on energy consumption and production show 
that total U.S. consumption in 1978 was the energy 
equivalent of about 13.8 billion barrels of petroleum.
5 
Of this total, assume that 11.5 billion barrels are 
consumed by the energy-poor region and 2.3 billion by 
the energy-rich region. Given a 1978 refined energy 
price of $18.80 per barrel-equivalent, the energy-poor 
consumers spend $216.2 billion for refined energy and 
the energy-rich, $43.2 billion. 
Of the 13.8 billion barrels consumed, 10.3 billion 
are assumed to be produced by the energy-rich region 
and 3.5 billion by foreign sources. I assume that the 
1979-80 shock doubles the price of crude energy from 
$8 to $16 per barrel-equivalent, and as a result, the 
price of refined energy increases by $8, from $18.80 to 
$26.80. In other words, crude energy producers take 
the entire value increase per barrel, and energy refiners 
pass along the full per unit cost increase to consumers. 
This approximates what actually happened to energy 
prices after the 1979-80 shock. 
U.S. consumers respond to the price hike by reducing 
their demand for energy by about 13 percent.
6 That puts 
their postshock energy consumption at 10 billion 
barrels for the energy-poor region and 2 billion barrels 
for the energy-rich. Multiplying these consumption 
figures by the higher price of refined energy ($26.80) 
gives a $62 billion increase in consumers' overall 
energy spending due to the shock—an energy bill 
nearly $52 billion higher for the energy-poor and over 
$10 billion higher for the energy-rich. 
I assume that the change in energy demand is borne 
entirely by foreign producers so that domestic crude 
output remains the same as before the shock, at 10.3 
billion barrels. This means that the domestic crude 
energy producers (located only in the energy-rich 
5 For the purposes of this paper, energy is not restricted to oil but is instead 
defined more broadly to include all forms—coal, natural gas, nuclear energy, 
and others. Energy is measured as an aggregate of its various physical forms, 
based on their total content of British thermal units (Btu). For convenience, all 
quantities of energy are converted to their equivalents in barrels of oil, using 
5,880 thousand Btu per barrel as the conversion rate. 
6The reduction in demand reflects an aggregate refined-energy demand 
elasticity of —0.3 percent, which says that for every one percentage point 
increase in the price of energy, demand for energy declines by three-tenths of a 
percent. This elasticity rate is consistent with some studies and also approxi-
mates what actually happened between 1979 and 1982. 
3 region) enjoy a windfall revenue gain of $82.4 billion. 
Now I assume that the entire windfall gain goes to 
households in the energy-rich region and that no 
redistributive factors operate in the economy. Given 
these assumptions, the relative effects of the price shock 
on the household income of each region are summa-
rized as follows: The energy-rich region gains $82.4 
billion from the production windfall while the energy-
poor region gains nothing. After paying off the increase 
in their energy bills, the energy-rich households have a 
net gain of $72 billion left for nonenergy spending 
whereas the energy-poor households have a net loss of 
$51.8 billion. 
A Measure of Income Transfer 
Given these figures, how do I measure the amount of 
income transferred from the energy-poor region to the 
energy-rich region as a result of the price increase? The 
measure used here is the amount of money the energy-
poor region would have had to transfer to the energy-
rich region without the shock to cause the same 
difference in the two household sectors' income for 
nonenergy spending as with the shock. That is, the 
energy-rich households' income for nonenergy spend-
ing went up by $72 billion, while that of the energy-
poor households went down by $51.8 billion, so the 
difference [$72 billion - ($-51.8 billion)] is $123.8 
billion. This same difference would be accomplished 
without an energy shock if the energy-poor households 
handed over $61.9 billion to the energy-rich house-
holds, for then the energy-rich households' income 
would rise by $61.9 billion, while the energy-poor 
households' income would fall by the same amount. So 
the difference [$61.9 billion - ($-61.9 billion)] is also 
$123.8 billion. Thus, the measure used here is the 
difference in the two regions' nonenergy household 
spending, divided by two. This measure is intended to 
parallel the loss in consumer welfare in one region and 
the gain in the other following the energy price shock. 
Without redistributive factors operating, the value of 
this income transfer measure is a substantial $61.9 
billion. 
• With Federal Taxes 
I now calculate a measure of income transfer that 
includes the redistributive factor of federal income 
taxes. (The step-by-step calculations are shown in 
Table 1.) I again assume a windfall revenue gain of 
$82.4 billion to U.S. crude energy producers in the 
energy-rich region. From this windfall the producers 
deduct royalty payments and state severance taxes, 
which then accrue as income to the energy-rich re-
gion.
7 The producers' before-tax profits are then $65.5 
billion. To these profits a federal corporate income tax 
is applied at the 1978 marginal rate of 52 percent, 
which gives $34.1 billion to Uncle Sam. The after-tax 
profits of $31.4 billion go as dividend payments to the 
energy-rich households, and these payments (plus 
royalties and severance tax gains totaling $ 16.9 billion) 
give them $48.3 billion. Now a personal income tax of 
20 percent is applied to the income gain of the energy-
rich households. The combined corporate and personal 
income tax revenues, totaling $43.8 billion, are redis-
tributed among households in proportions roughly 
equivalent to population: one-sixth ($7.3 billion) to the 
energy-rich region and five-sixths ($36.5 billion) to the 
energy-poor region. From the resulting income, the 
increased energy spending is subtracted to give the 
amount of windfall revenue available for nonenergy 
spending. 
From these results, the income transfer formula is 
applied: [$35.5 billion - ($-15.3 billion)] -5- 2 = $25.4 
billion. This amount, then, is the income transferred 
from the energy-poor region to the energy-rich one 
when the redistributive effects of federal corporate and 
personal income taxes are taken into account. 
• With Taxes, Stock Dividends, and Royalties 
Calculations similar to those in Table 1 can be per-
formed to incorporate the effects of cross-regional 
stock ownership and royalty holdings into the income 
transfer measure. In those calculations (not shown here) 
one-fourth of the royalty payments and two-thirds of 
the dividends accrue as income to the energy-poor 
region.
8 The resulting changes in nonenergy household 
spending are then used in the income transfer formula: 
[$16.8 billion - ($3.7 billion)] ^2 = $6.6 billion. 
This result shows that the cumulative effect of three 
of the redistributive factors is significant in reducing the 
amount of income transferred. Their significance is 
especially evident if this measure is compared with the 
original estimate of $61.9 billion when no redistributive 
factors were operant. The measure with the three 
factors reduces the original estimate by $55.3 billion. 
More to Consider 
The results of the preliminary estimate are useful in that 
7Based on observations from 1978 data, I assume a flat royalty rate of 12.5 
percent and a flat severance tax rate of 8 percent. Note that royalty payments 
and severance taxes do not work to redistribute income in the calculations of 
Table 1, but the two factors do affect taxes. 
8The fractional shares are based on a reasonable assumption from observa-
tions on geographic patterns of royalty holdings and on a study of share 
ownership in sixteen U.S. oil companies (cited in Kalt and Leone 1984). 
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Table 1 
Redistribution of Windfall Revenue Gains Via Federal Income Taxes 
(Billions of Dollars) 
Accrues as Income to 
0 , r Household Accounts in the 
Crude Energy 
Producers' Energy-Rich Energy-Poor 
Item Accounts Region Region 
Windfall Revenue  $82.4  $0  $0 
Tax Deductibles 
Royalty Payments (12.5%) 







Before-Tax Profit  65.5  0  0 
• Federal Corporate Income Tax (52%)  -34.1  0  0 
After-Tax Profit  31.4  31.4  0 
Change in Before-Tax Personal Income  48.3  0 
• Personal Income Tax (20%)  -9.7  0 
After-Tax Personal Income  38.6  0 
• Transfer Payments from 
Federal Tax Revenue*  7.3  36.5 
Gross Change in Personal Income  45.9  36.5 
Increase in Postshock Energy Spending  -10.4  -51.8 
Windfall Gain Available for 
Nonenergy Household Spending  35.5  -15.3 
'Federal tax revenue totaling $43.8 billion ($34.1 billion plus $9.7 billion) are redistributed in proportions 
corresponding to population: one-sixth to the energy-rich region and five-sixths to the energy-poor region. 
they provide a measure of the initial direct effects of the 
1979-80 shock—a measure that considers three of the 
redistributive factors. But in that simple framework a 
number of important effects and interactions aren't 
handled adequately: 
• Interregional trade. One issue needing consideration 
is the redistributive effect of interregional trade. 
Because the preliminary estimate is based on the 
assumption that all windfall gains are spent in the 
region in which they accrue, the estimate simply 
ignores trade. But people who receive windfall gains 
would be likely to spend some of their new income 
on goods produced outside their region. For instance, 
an oil magnate in Texas might use profits from oil to 
buy a car made in Detroit. So an estimate of income 
transfer should allow for changes in trade resulting 
from an energy price change. 
• Adjustments over time. Another issue to consider is 
how people adjust to the price shock over time. The 
preliminary estimate provides a static accounting of 
the primary direct effects of the price shock. A fuller 
accounting of income transfer would need to con-
5 sider how people adjust their behavior in response to 
the shock and how these adjustments, over time, 
work their way through the economy. Among these 
adjustments are substitution effects—the adjustments 
producers and consumers make to a price increase 
by using other resources instead of the higher-priced 
commodity. For example, after an upward energy 
price shock, a trucking firm might tell its drivers to 
reduce truck speeds to 50 miles per hour to substitute 
more labor (driver hours) and capital (truck hours) 
for higher-priced diesel fuel. Or, a homeowner might 
substitute more capital (attic insulation) or goods (an 
extra sweater) for higher-priced heating fuel. 
Despite their adjustments to conserve energy, 
consumers would still be likely to find themselves 
spending more dollars on energy and, as a result, 
would have that much less to spend on their region's 
business goods and services. Subsequently, lost sales 
would cause some worker layoffs and production 
cutbacks, which in turn would reduce consumer 
spending even further. This economic chain reaction 
multiplies the initial effects of a shock over time, and 
this ripple effect needs to be considered in measuring 
interregional income transfer. 
• Refinements. Some additional refinements about 
differences in consumer behavior could also be 
considered. The preliminary estimate assumes that 
all consumers react to the price shock in the same 
way, reducing their energy demand by the same 
percentage. But 1978 data show that energy prices 
and the intensity of energy use vary among sectors 
and regions of the economy and that, accordingly, 
different sectors respond to a price increase by 
reducing their demand in different proportions. A 
fuller accounting could consider these differences. 
To deal with these additional considerations, we 
need a way to systematically account for a number of 
economic sectors, the income and spending flows 
among them, and the adjustments to these flows that 
would be likely to occur as the result of a price shock. 
In short, we need a model. 
The Model 
This section presents a stylized model of the U.S. 
economy to analyze systematically the interregional 
income transfer resulting from an energy price shock.
9 
The model is structured so that it can consider the four 
redistributive factors—federal taxes, stock ownership, 
royalty holdings, and interregional trade. In addition, 
the model also can account for the substitution effects, 
chain reactions, and differences in each sector's de-
mand that could all be expected to accompany a price 
shock. I begin by describing each of the model's sectors; 
then I explain how the sectors are interrelated through a 
set of matrixes and prices and show how the model is 
solved. 
Sectors 
The model consists of thirteen sectors grouped into a 
foreign sector and the domestic economy, made up 
of a federal government sector and two regions—one 
energy-rich and the other energy-poor. (See the dia-
gram of model sectors in Chart 1.) The two domestic 
regions each contain five sectors, the same five types in 
each. The energy-rich region, however, contains an 
additional sector, which is the only domestic sector that 
produces any crude energy. 
The premise that all domestic crude energy produc-
tion is confined to the energy-rich region means, of 
course, that neither the energy-rich nor the energy-poor 
region corresponds exactly to any actual grouping of 
states. Instead, the two domestic regions are stylized 
abstractions of the U.S. regional situation in 1978, just 
before the 1979-80 energy price shock. 
To model the energy-rich region, I use state data for 
three key energy-producing states—Texas, Oklahoma, 
and Louisiana—as a template for determining the 
region's patterns of energy use. This seems reasonable, 
since those states produced about half of the nation's 
crude energy in 1978. As modeled, the energy-rich 
region can be loosely thought of as a composite U.S. 
region containing those three states as well as some 
other states and portions of states where crude energy 
production predominates. The region represents about 
one-sixth of the nation's population. 
At a very basic level, the model's sectors are linked 
by flows of physical energy or other materials. Goods 
and services produced in one sector are purchased and 
used by other sectors and thus serve as intersector links. 
For instance, Chart 1 shows how sectors are connected 
by flows of crude and refined energy. For ease of 
exposition, the model's sectors can be grouped accord-
ing to the energy flows as follows: producers of crude 




9The model presented here draws upon earlier studies by Hudson and 
Jorgenson (1976), Krohm (1981), Nelson (1984), and Kalt and Leone (1984, 
1986). A technical paper describing the model in detail will be available on 
request to the Research Department. 
10A standard way of grouping sectors in input-output models like the one 
presented here is by processing and final demand, sectors, as in Hudson and 
Jorgenson 1976. In my exposition, the processing sectors correspond to sectors 
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In the model, the U.S. economy's needs for crude energy 
are met by two energy-producing sectors: a foreign 
sector, simply called OPEC, and a domestic crude 
energy sector, located in the energy-rich region. Based 
on observations from 1978 data, I assume that these 
two sectors provided the U.S. economy with a total 
of 13.8 billion barrel-equivalents of energy. Of that 
amount, about 25 percent is assigned to OPEC and the 









Crude Energy • = Energy-Poor Region 
Refined Energy • = Energy-Rich Region 
It is assumed that all of OPEC's proceeds from 
energy exported to the United States are used to buy 
goods and services from U.S. businesses. This trade is 




3-8 and the final demand sectors to sectors 1,2,9-13. The Hudson-Jorgenson 
grouping is used in performing the model's calculations. 
1
1
 This assumption does not require that OPEC, of itself, spend its energy 
proceeds on U.S. business output; rather, it requires that OPEC plus other 
foreign buyers as a composite do so. Thus, trade is balanced, and the only 
foreign trade explicit in the model is trade financed by U.S. import dollars. 
Other foreign trade is assumed to be in balance and thus to net zero for U.S. 
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7 tic crude energy sector also buys goods and services 
from businesses in both the energy-rich and the energy-
poor regions; in addition, it buys some refined energy 
from its own region's refiners. 
• Refiners 
Crude energy from OPEC and the domestic crude 
energy sector is processed into refined energy by four 
domestic refining sectors, two in each region. (For 
simplicity, it is assumed that one barrel of crude energy 
is required to produce one barrel of refined energy.) The 
refining sectors are divided into two types: those 
producing refined energy for business and those pro-
ducing it for households. This split is an attempt to 
portray four different aggregate refining technologies 
to accommodate the observations, based on 1978 data, 
that for each energy unit, households pay more than 
businesses and energy-poor states pay more than 
energy-rich ones. The price disparity among sectors is 
explained by the value added in processing, packaging, 
transporting, and distributing refined energy as well as 
by the fact that energy-poor states tend to be located 
farther from crude energy sources than energy-rich 
states. Since different average prices would reflect 
different production costs, this difference needs to be 
accounted for in the model by the four separate refining 
technologies. 
In their own production processes, the four refiners 
use some refined energy for processing. (Refined 
energy is also used for processing by the energy-rich 
region's crude energy sector.) Most of the refined 
energy, however, goes to the model's main energy 
consumers. 
• Consumers 
The four principal consumers of refined energy consist 
of a business and a household sector for each region. To 
model these four sectors, I regrouped data on 1978 
energy spending and consumption, published by the 
Energy Information Administration (1978), to repre-
sent these two types of energy consumers. This division 
of consumers into businesses and households is neces-
sary because changes in regional household spending 
are used to calculate the income transfer measure. 
Business. The two business sectors produce all the 
nonenergy goods in the economy. In the production 
process, each uses refined energy from its region, labor 
from its region's household sector, and some business 
sector output (in the form of semiprocessed or inter-
mediate goods) from itself and the other region's 
business sector. The goods produced by the two 
business sectors can be thought of as the primary stuff 
of gross national product (GNP). 
Except for the federal government, all of the model's 
sectors buy products from the business sectors; the 
household sectors, however, patronize only the business 
sector in their own region. (In other words, when 
Texans buy cars made in Detroit, they make their 
purchases at a Texas dealership.) Because each busi-
ness sector's output is exported to all but two sectors, 
the model can account for the interregional effects of an 
energy price shock as they feed back and forth between 
regions through changes in the level of trade. 
As modeled, the two business sectors use a substan-
tial part (roughly 50 percent) of their own output as 
production inputs.
12 This intrasector feature allows the 
model to account for the chain reaction effects on 
secondary or supporting industries when demand for 
primary business output changes. 
Households. The household sectors, one per region, 
consume refined energy and business sector output. 
Households also play the role of supplying labor to the 
business and energy sectors within their own region, 
and for their labor they receive wages. 
Besides earning income from wages, households in 
both regions receive dividend income by owning stock. 
As modeled, stock ownership in general corporations is 
distributed evenly among households in both regions. 
In contrast, households in the energy-rich region own 
twice as much stock in crude energy-producing com-
panies, on average, as do households in the energy-poor 
region. These assumptions on stock ownership patterns, 
based on data from the New York Stock Exchange 
(1982) and shares used by Kalt and Leone (1984), are 
how the model accounts for the redistributive effect of 
cross-regional stock ownership. 
Households in both regions also collect royalty pay-
ments from holding mineral rights to crude energy 
extracted in the energy-rich region. It is assumed, how-
ever, that energy-rich households receive 50 percent of 
all royalty payments made, whereas energy-poor house-
holds receive only 25 percent. (The remaining 25 
percent goes to government.) This assumption seems 
reasonable, since it is likely that royalty holdings would 
be closely tied to early patterns of land ownership. This 
feature of the model thus takes into account the role 
of royalty holdings in redistributing income among 
regions. 
12The ratio of intrasector-to-total output is based on generalized data from 
input-output models of the U.S. economy. See, for example, Yan 1969, p. 57. 
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• Governments 
To account for the redistributive effects of taxes on 
interregional income transfer, the model includes three 
government sectors: two regional governments and a 
federal government. The revenues of the three sectors 
are provided primarily by taxes. Each regional govern-
ment taxes all sectors within its region, and the federal 
government taxes all domestic sectors except regional 
governments. The federal government and the energy-
rich region's government also collect some royalty 
payments from holding mineral rights to domestic 
crude energy. Based on information published at the 
time on the amount of royalties received by federal and 
state governments, I allocate 15 percent of all royalty 
payments to the federal government and 10 percent to 
the energy-rich region's government. 
The spending behavior of the regional and federal 
governments differs. The regional governments spend 
some of their revenues for business sector output, 
mostly from their own region but some from the other 
one. The remaining revenues are distributed as direct 
transfer payments back to their own region's household 
sector. The federal government, in contrast, buys 
neither goods nor energy. Instead, it simply divides its 
revenue between the two regional governments ac-
cording to some specified proportion and returns the 
revenue as intergovernmental transfer payments. In 
the model, the specified proportion is based on the 
population of each domestic region: one-sixth to the 
energy-rich and five-sixths to the energy-poor. 
In reality, of course, governments use appreciable 
amounts of labor, energy, and other inputs to produce 
a portion of measured GNP. In the model, however, 
government energy and labor inputs are accounted for 
indirectly in the goods and services purchased from the 
two business sectors. Thus, as modeled, the govern-
ment sectors are quite stylized abstractions intended, 
together, to reflect the income transfer aspect of 
government policies. 
Relationships Among Sectors 
The model's thirteen sectors have now been identified 
and briefly described in relationship to the flows of 
crude and refined energy. If, however, an attempt were 
made to depict not just energy flows but all intersector 
flows of products, labor, and payments, the resulting 
flowchart would be quite complex. A simpler, more 
convenient way of representing the model's structure, 
with all its intersector connections, is with matrixes, 
such as the one shown in Chart 2. 
The matrix of Chart 2, consisting of rows and col-
umns for each of the thirteen sectors, may be thought 
of as a general summary of all the model's intersector 
transactions. Each letter in a cell represents a trans-
action between two sectors (identified by row and 
column heads). In some cells, more than one letter 
appears, indicating different types of intersector trans-
actions. When a cell has the same row and column 
number (that is, a cell located on the matrix's diagonal), 
then an intrasector transaction is indicated. If a cell is 
blank, then no relevant transaction occurs between the 
two sectors. 
The matrix can be read in two ways, depending on 
the type of flows being tracked—flows of physical 
quantities or flows of dollar payments. On one level, it 
can be read as an input-output quantities matrix, called 
matrix Q, summarizing the physical flows of energy, 
business output, and labor among sectors. The sectors 
of rows 1—10 are the sellers of output to the buyers of 
columns 1-12. When reading across the rows, matrix Q 
traces the output from each sector as it becomes input to 
another: Output from the crude energy sectors (rows 
1-2) becomes input to the four energy-refining sectors 
(columns 3-6). Output from the energy refiners (rows 
3-6) is used in processing (by columns 2-6) or be-
comes input to the energy consumers (columns 7-10). 
Output from the business sectors (rows 7-8) goes to all 
sectors except the federal government (column 13) and 
the other region's household sector (column 9 or 10). 
The household sectors (rows 9-10) provide labor 
(hours worked) to the producing sectors of their 
respective regions (columns 2-8). [Note that the divi-
dends, royalties, transfer payments, and taxes of the 
household and government sectors (rows 9-13) are 
purely financial transactions and are therefore excluded 
from the product flows of matrix Q.] For matrix Q, all 
quantities in a row can be summed across to determine 
a sector's total output. The columns, however, cannot 
be summed because their cells represent a variety of 
physical inputs (energy, goods and services, hours 
worked). Even so, the entries in each column can be 
thought of as a recipe of inputs used by each producing 
sector. 
On a second level, Chart 2 can be read as a payment 
flows matrix, called matrix F, accounting for each 
sector's spending to and income from another sector. 
So rather than tracking quantities, matrix F tracks 
dollar payments representing sales and purchases of 
products as well as payments representing purely 
financial transactions. Because the payment flows 
move in the opposite direction from the product flows 
of matrix Q, matrix F is read down the columns. For 
9 Chart 2 Matrix of Intersector Flows 
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instance, reading down column 2 shows that the 
domestic crude energy sector spends money to buy 
refined energy (from row 3), business sector output 
(from rows 7-8), and labor (from row 9). After making 
all these production payments, sector 2 uses its re-
maining revenue to make financial payments: dividends 
(to rows 9-10), royalty payments (to rows 9-11 and 
13), and taxes (to rows 11 and 13). The sum of all 
entries in a column gives the total spending s for that 
column's sector, and the sum of all payments in a row 
gives the total income y for that row's sector. In the 
model, each sector's total spending is set equal to its 
total income: s = y. This stipulation is in the spirit of 
general equilibrium modeling, which requires all 
sectors of an economy to be in a sustainable balance 
and all markets to clear. 
To structure the model so that an energy price shock 
can be depicted systematically, two other matrixes are 
needed. The two can be constructed from matrixes Q 
and Ff respectively, by expressing their values in rel-
ative terms. The first is derived from matrix Q by 
dividing each cell in a column by that column sector's 
total output (or row total). This operation, once per-
formed for all cells, produces a matrix of input-output 
ratios, or coefficients, defining the relative sizes of all 
inputs and outputs. I refer to this matrix of input-output 
coefficients as matrix A. Each coefficient of matrix A 
says that to produce one unit of output from a column's 
sector, the quantity of inputs specified by the coefficient 
is needed from a given row's sector. Matrix A thus 
provides a useful summary of all the model's produc-
tion relationships—that is, the technology of the 
modeled economy. 
The second of the two matrixes can be derived in a 
similar manner by calculating relative payment flows 
from matrix F. Each cell of matrix F is divided by its 
column total. This operation, once performed for all 
cells, produces the matrix of spending coefficients, in 
which the individual elements (coefficients) are the 
fractional shares of total spending from a column sector 
to a row sector. I refer to this matrix of spending 
coefficients as matrix B. In matrix B, the columns must 
add up to one, since each cell represents a fraction of 
total spending for the column in which it appears. 
Solving the Model 
The four matrixes just described are related to each 
other by a set of relative prices of inputs and outputs p 
used by the producing sectors. The prices of crude 
energy and labor inputs are exogenous (taken as given 
from outside the model) whereas the prices of produced 
goods are endogenous (determined within the model) 
by the use of cost-markup equations. 
The relationships between the price set and the 
matrixes can be expressed with simple algebraic nota-
tion. Assume the input-output coefficients of matrix A 
depend on relative prices: A(p). Then let the spending 
coefficients in matrix B be denoted by 
(1) B(p)=pA(p)+W(p) 
where 
pA(p) = spending shares for production 
payments 
W(p) — spending shares for financial trans-
actions (dividends, royalties, tax 
payments, and government transfers), 
also dependent on relative prices. 
Let y be the total income received by each sector and let 
s be each sector's total spending. The relationship 
between y and s can be expressed as 
(2) y = B(p)s. 
Since this relationship holds for any level of income, an 
additional constraint is needed to set the income level 
at some benchmark. In the preshock version of the 
model, a constant k is added, corresponding to the total 
U.S. wage bill (the labor income paid to the two house-
hold sectors). The constant k also depends on prices: 
k(p). Thus, the model is 
(3) y = B(p)s + k(p). 
Using the equilibrium condition that y = s, a solution to 
the model for a given p is a y* such that 
(4) / = B(p)y* + k(p). 
From equation (4) the payment flows of matrix Fcan be 
calculated: 
(5) F(p) = B(p)y*. 
And from equation (5) the quantity flows of matrix Q 
can then be calculated: 
(6) Q(p) = F(p)/p. 
In short, this notation shows that if values can be as-
11 signed to the coefficients in matrixes A and B and to k, 
then values for sector incomes y and matrixes F and Q 
can be calculated, given a vector of prices p.
13 
Modeling the 1979-80 Energy Price Shock 
Having explained how the model works in general 
terms, I now apply it to the 1979-80 energy price 
shock. Three steps are involved: First, the model's 
parameters and coefficients are set to reflect the 
preshock conditions of the U.S. economy, and the 
model is solved. Second, some model parameters and 
coefficients are changed to reflect how producers and 
consumers would adjust to the 1979-80 shock given a 
couple years' time; then the model is solved again. 
Third, the model's pre- and postshock solutions are 
compared; specifically, I compare the changes in the 
two household sectors' income available for nonenergy 
spending. From these figures, the measure of income 
transfer from energy-poor to energy-rich households 
can be calculated. In addition, the model can be used 
to perform some experiments to quantify how much 
each of the four redistributive factors contributed to 
the income transfer measure. 
Before the Shock 
To begin, the model needs to mimic, within its stylized 
structure, conditions in the U.S. economy just before 
the shock. To do this, data from 1978 or estimates from 
other studies are used to set parameters and specify 
coefficients in matrixes A and B.
u But because not all 
values can be specified in this way, some components of 
the two matrixes remain as free parameters. These are 
calibrated by solving 
(7) y=B(pt)yt + k(pt) 
where time t = 1978. That is, the free parameters are 
assigned values to produce sector income results that 
approximate the actual data for 1978 income flows. 
(For example, average tax rates are set so as to generate 
aggregate government revenues for 1978.) Once the 
values for all coefficients, prices, and total income 
levels are known, it is a simple matter, using equations 
(5) and (6), to compute the preshock values for the 
product flows in matrix Q and the payment flows in 
matrix F. 
After the Shock 
The next step involves setting a postshock price for 
crude energy, which in turn changes the model's 
parameters and coefficients to reflect how sectors 
would be expected to adjust to the shock. Essentially, 
the model works through the following scenario: 
1. OPEC sets a new world price for crude energy that 
doubles the price to U.S. refiners, and domestic crude 
energy producers follow suit. In the model, the 
exogenous price of crude energy is raised from $8 to 
$16—an increase corresponding to what happened 
to that price in 1979-80. 
2. Businesses raise their prices to reflect higher energy and 
production costs. In the model, cost-markup equa-
tions are applied by the producing sectors (refined 
energy and business) to set the absolute prices of 
their outputs. 
3. Energy refiners reduce the amount of crude energy 
imported from OPEC. The ratio of imported-to-
domestic crude energy, a parameter that adjusts 
some coefficients in matrix A, is lowered from 0.25 
to 0.16, corresponding to observed data for imported 
energy within a few years after the shock. The data 
suggest that U.S. refiners preferred domestic over 
foreign crude energy available at the same price. 
4. As the relative price of energy increases, households 
and businesses reduce their consumption of refined 
energy. Price elasticities of demand (model param-
13The notation used here is purposely streamlined to convey the basics of 
the model in simplest terms. In the actual model, for example, the pA(p) in 
equation (1) is computed as the indicated matrix product only for the six 
processing sectors (sectors 3-8). The computed matrix is then augmented by 
relevant spending share parameters for the other seven sectors to construct a 
full 13x13 matrix matching the dimensions of B( p). For the purposes of solving 
the model, the dimensions of system (2) are augmented to include equations 
that fix the level of employment hours for the two regions, so system (3) is 
actually larger than system (2). In system (6),p represents a six-element vector 
of prices, whereas in system (\)p is a 6 x 6 matrix of relative prices P(that is, 
sector-by-sector ratios of input prices to output prices). Some technical niceties 
(essential for computation purposes) are smoothed over to keep the notation 
simple, including the point that the product pA(p) in (1) is actually element-by-
element multiplication of two matrixes P and A(p) of equal size. And the 
matrix-vector product B(p)s in (2) technically requires the transpose s' of the 
row vector s in order to be properly defined. The matrix-vector product B(p)y in 
(5) is technically an element-by-element multiplication of matrix B(p) by 
column vector}', by which every element in the first row in B{p) is multiplied by 
the first element in y, and so on for the remaining rows, to construct a new 
matrix F(p) the same size as B(p). Similarly, the quotient F(p)/p in (6) is 
technically an element-by-element division of matrix F(p) by column vector/?, 
by which all the elements in the first row in matrix F(p) are divided by the first 
element in p, and so on, to create a new matrix Q(p) equal in size to F(p). 
Finally, F(p) in (6) is a 6 x 13 portion (the six rows representing the processing 
sectors) of the 13x13 matrix F(p) in (5). 
14For example, to assign values for the producing sectors' spending shares 
pA(p), I examined an assortment of published aggregate data from 1978 
income statements for major energy corporations and for corporations in 
general. Industry revenues were divided into expense categories roughly 
corresponding to the model's input-supplying sectors: crude energy (for 
refining sectors only), refined energy, nonenergy business inputs, and labor. The 
remaining expenditures were categorized as a profit margin, consisting of tax 
payments and after-tax profits returned to stockholders. 
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eters specifying how much a sector's consumption 
changes per unit change in relative price) are used to 
decrease relative consumption. For households, the 
energy consumed per dollar of disposable income is 
the parameter reduced. For the producing sectors, 
the coefficients for refined energy inputs in matrix A 
are reduced. The elasticities used vary for each 
consuming sector and are based on calculations 
from observed changes in the average price and 
consumption of energy from two to three years after 
the shock. 
5. Producers use relatively less energy and relatively more 
labor and other inputs in their production processes. 
For the producing sectors, the input-output coeffi-
cients for energy in matrix A are reduced (as in step 
4) whereas coefficients for labor and business inputs 
are increased to reflect the substitution away from 
energy. (The quantitative amounts of these adjust-
ments are taken from parameters in Hudson and 
Jorgenson 1976.) 
6. The producers' input adjustments result in a less 
efficient combination of resources under the existing 
technology, so overall business output drops. The total 
output of the two business sectors in matrix Q is 
decreased by using an input parameter that specifies 
the percentage of efficiency loss as a function of the 
overall price level increase. (The theoretical and 
empirical bases for this adjustment are found in 
Tatom 1981 and Miller, Supel, and Turner 1980, 
respectively.) The reduced quantity of aggregate real 
output for the business sectors serves as the basis for 
the constant k of the postshock model. 
7. As income levels change, tax revenues collected by state 
and federal governments change in proportion to their 
effective marginal tax rates. In matrix B, spending 
coefficients related to average tax rates in W(p) are 
adjusted according to the new income flows and 
actual marginal tax rates in 1982. 
Once these adjustments are incorporated into the 
model, the postshock values for p\ A(p'), W(p'), and 
k(p') can be computed. Then the postshock version of 
the model can be solved:
1
5 
(8) y'* = B(p')y'* + *(/>') 
= [p'A(p')+W(p')]y'* + k(p'). 
Results 
Once the pre- and postshock versions of the model are 
solved, the solutions y* and y'* can be compared to see 
what has changed. Since the income transfer measure 
focuses on the effects of the shock on income flows, the 
changes between the pre- and postshock versions of the 
payments flow matrix Ft reported in Table 2, are 
examined. The table shows that the shock increases the 
household income available for nonenergy spending 
(that is, for purchases of business sector output) by $ 12 
billion for the energy-rich region but decreases it by 
$15.6 billion for the energy-poor one. (In real terms, 
the resulting changes in each region's nonenergy 
household spending are an increase of 0.7 percent for 
the energy-rich region and a decline of 6.7 percent 
for the energy-poor.) Applying the income transfer 
measure to these results gives [$12 billion — ($—15.6 
billion)] -r 2 = $13.8 billion. 
The model's $ 13.8 billion measure of income trans-
fer is roughly on the same order of magnitude as the 
earlier, preliminary estimate of $6.6 billion. Certainly, 
both the preliminary and model estimates are far less 
than those cited by some observers at the time of the 
shock. The model's estimate builds in much more detail 
than the preliminary estimate, however, by considering 
all four redistributive factors, adjustments over time, 
and differences among sectors. 
Some Experiments 
The model can be used to conduct some experiments 
that quantify how much each redistributive factor 
lessened the income transferred from energy-poor to 
energy-rich households. The general method of each 
experiment involves adjusting certain coefficients, 
when solving the postshock model, to suppress one of 
the redistributive factors in the model's results. To do 
this, selected postshock flows responsible for redis-
tributing income are reset to their preshock levels. 
Solving the adjusted postshock model then provides 
one way of estimating what the change in postshock 
income flows would have been if the redistributive 
factor had not been at work. 
The simple mathematical notation can be used to 
summarize the method of the experiments as follows: 
Take elements of the spending coefficients for financial 
payments W(p) and call them w(p). Let the preshock 
version of these elements be the same as the postshock 
version: 
15Prices p' and the matrix A(p') must be solved simultaneously, since 
product prices depend on A. Let pq = input prices and pA = product prices. We 
have A = A(pA,p0) and pA = /(A,pq), where p = (pA,Po)
 and/reflects a 
cost-markup equation. Givenp
fQ, we solve forp\ and A(p\,p'o) using a simple 
iterative process. 
13 (9) w(p) = w(p'). 
Then let 
{
W(p') for elements not in w(p) 
W(p) for elements in w(p). 
The experiment is to compute an adjusted postshock 
solution 
(11) /'* = [p'A(p') + WXp'W* + k(p'). 
The income transfer formula is then applied to the 
results of the y "* solution to produce a measure that can 
be compared with the y'* income transfer measure of 
$13.8 billion, calculated earlier. 
The results of these experiments are reported in 
Chart 3. Since the redistributive factors interact, it is not 
appropriate to expect the results to add up as compo-
nents of a total. The calculations do, however, provide 
some idea of the relative contribution of each factor in 
lessening the amount of income transferred between 
regions. 
• Federal Taxes 
The first experiment attempts to quantify how much 
federal income taxes, both corporate and personal, 
lessened the income transfer measure from what it 
would have been without this factor. To do this, I adjust 
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the postshock model by setting the federal marginal tax 
rates in matrix B to zero. Then I readjust the regional 
government tax rates so that their tax revenues equal 
what the total tax revenue for both regional and federal 
governments had been before the shock. This pro-
cedure ensures that government, as a whole, continues 
to collect the same amount of taxes from the tax-paying 
sectors under the experiment; however, all tax revenues 
are spent by the regional government in which the 
revenues were raised. Thus, the redistributive effect of 
federal taxes is eliminated. 
With these adjustments in place, the model produces 
an income transfer measure of $37.5 billion. Sub-
tracting the income transfer result of $13.8 billion with 
all factors operating gives $23.7 billion as the amount 




• Stock Ownership 
The second experiment attempts to measure how 
much cross-regional stock ownership changed the 
amount of income transferred between regions. Recall 
that the model's initial parameters had stock ownership 
in general corporations to be widely dispersed geo-
graphically. In contrast, the stockholders of crude 
energy-producing companies were assumed to be like-
lier to reside in the energy-rich region, so twice as many 
of these shares were held by residents of the energy-rich 
region than by residents of the energy-poor one. 
For the experiment, I reset the dividend-related co-
efficients in matrix B so that energy-poor households 
receive the same amount of dividends after the shock as 
they did before. Thus, any shock-induced changes in 
corporate profits (from sectors 2-8) are all rechanneled 
to stockholders in the energy-rich region. 
Results of the experiment show that of the four re-
distributive factors, cross-regional stock ownership had 
the largest impact—$32.2 billion—on reducing the 
amount of income transferred from the energy-poor 
region to the energy-rich one. 
• Royalty Holdings 
The third experiment attempts to measure the amount 
by which royalty payments from cross-regional owner-
ship of mineral rights lessen income transfer. For the 
experiment, I set the royalty payment shares between 
the two household sectors so that payments to energy-
poor households remain the same after the shock as 
they were before. The results show that of the four 
factors, royalty holdings had the least impact on the 
income transfer measure, lessening it by only $2.1 
billion. 
Chart 3 
Results of Model Experiments 
Amount Each Redistributive Factor Lessened the Income 
Transferred from Energy-Poor to Energy-Rich Households 
(Billions of Dollars) 
All Federal Stock Royalty Interregional 
Factors Taxes Ownership Holdings Trade 
' Experiment with Factor Suppressed ' 
• Interregional Trade 
The final experiment removes the interregional trade 
factor from the postshock version of the model to 
measure its impact on income transfer. In the model, 
all sectors except the federal government and each 
region's own household sector buy output from both 
business sectors. So any positive change in revenues 
from any producing sectors might be expected to spill 
over to the other region through expanded imports. 
(Conversely, any negative change in revenues might be 
expected to reduce imports from the other region.) The 
experiment eliminates the interregional trade factor by 
adjusting model parameters so that each sector's pur-
chases from the other region's business sector remain 
16The model experiments to measure the redistributive effects of the four 
factors do not attempt to incorporate the effects of the Crude Oil Windfall Profit 
Tax Act of 1980.1 did, however, run a model simulation to include the effects of 
this tax. The results show an income transfer measure of $ 13.2 billion with the 
windfall tax included—an amount not appreciably different from the $13.8 
billion result without it. 
15 the same as under preshock conditions. Thus, changes 
in each sector's demand for inputs fall solely on its own 
region rather than acting directly to stimulate or 
depress business in the other region. 
Results of this experiment show that the feedback 
effects of interregional trade served to reduce the 
income transfer measure by $9.7 billion—a much 
smaller reduction than those due to federal taxes or 
stock ownership. That this reduction is smaller, how-
ever, is hardly surprising, since interregional trade 
effects are generally a less direct path for rechanneling 
income flows. 
Summary and Conclusions 
This paper has shown how a stylized model of inter-
sector product and payment flows can be used to 
analyze the interregional impact of an energy price 
shock. In analyzing the impact, the model takes into 
account the redistributive effects of the federal tax 
system, cross-regional ownership of stocks and mineral 
rights, and interregional trade. It also accounts for some 
substitution effects and chain reactions resulting from a 
shock. When applied to the 1979-80 upward energy 
price shock, the model's results show that the redis-
tributive factors substantially lessened the amount of 
household income transferred from the energy-poor 
region to the energy-rich one. 
Still, the nearly $14 billion in income transferred 
from the energy-poor households to the energy-rich 
ones is significant, for that measure represents a 
continuing, annual transfer of income from the energy-
poor region to the energy-rich one. Expressed in 
present-value terms (assuming an interest rate of 10 
percent), the stream of income transferred is equivalent 
to a one-time transfer of $140 billion. Since values of 
assets reflect the value of the income they earn, their 
values would be expected to change significantly in the 
two regions. To take a current example, the 1986 
energy price crash has resulted in falling home prices in 
Texas and in turn has caused significant losses to that 
state's financial community. 
Like most economic models, this one has its virtues 
and limitations. Among its virtues are the model's full 
accounting for the complex of intersector transactions 
on both spending and income sides; its systematic 
representation of sector technologies through the input-
output matrix structure; its attempt to fuse the matrix 
modeling approach with a general equilibrium ap-
proach; and its structural detail, which is based on 
observed data. 
Among the limitations of the calibrated model are 
the various stylizations and simplifications used to 
depict complicated economic relationships among sec-
tors and regions. Examples of these limitations include 
the following: 
• The two regions, as modeled, portray a worst-case 
scenario in energy resource disparity rather than 
corresponding to any actual groupings of states. 
• The assumption that the OPEC sector spends all its 
increase in energy-dollar profits on U.S. business 
output is an oversimplification. 
• The model generates an increase in the energy-rich 
region's labor hours and a decrease in the energy-
poor region's hours (both ranging from 2 to 3 
percent) but without accounting for the probable 
migration of labor between the two regions. 
• Because the model uses an aggregate household 
sector for each region, it can't capture the differences 
in households' asset holdings and energy use that are 
observed across income groups. 
• The model doesn't distinguish between investment 
and consumption, so it can't capture the investment 
booms or busts associated with an energy price 
shock. 
These limitations suggest directions for improve-
ments and future research. For instance, it might be 
desirable to divide the model's two household sectors 
into high- and low-income households, since upper-
income households are likelier to hold stocks and are 
therefore likelier to benefit from the windfall gains of 
energy companies. Using data on the distribution of 
income and asset holdings, the results of this division 
might well show upper-income households in the 
energy-poor region enjoying real income gains and the 
lower-income households in the energy-rich region 
suffering income losses. 
Another improvement to the model would be to 
incorporate business investment. As it stands, the model 
doesn't explicitly allow for the redistributive channel of 
investment to respond to a price change. However, 
investment to expand production capacity is an im-
portant component of production, and relative price 
changes would affect such investment. For instance, 
an upward energy price shock would be expected to 
stimulate investment in energy exploration and energy-
economizing technology. 
Although the model used here is calibrated to 
analyze a specific energy price shock, its framework 
could be extended and adjusted to other such shocks. 
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For instance, it would be relatively easy to adapt the 
model to analyze a downward energy price shock, such 
as the one in 1986. To do so, most of the processes 
modeled here could be reversed to produce an income 
transfer from the energy-rich to the energy-poor region. 
Of course, some model coefficients would need adjust-
ment to account for changing patterns of economic 
behavior and the tax changes that have occurred since 
the 1978 conditions to which the model is calibrated. 
Even so, it is likely that the model's basic results would 
be similar, showing that the redistributive factors ex-
amined would substantially lessen the amount of 
income transferred between the two regions. 
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